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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-The Constitutional Limits of the
Power to Regulate: Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch

I. INTRODUCTION
In Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,' the United States Supreme
Court clarified the constitutional limits of a state's power to regulate
electric utility rates. The case arose when Duquesne Light Company
and Pennsylvania Power Company appealed a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.2 In that decision the Pennsylvania court
held that under the state's Public Utility Code' electric utilities were
prohibited from recovering costs of cancelled nuclear power plants
from ratepayers." Both utilities charged that the cost exclusion
amounted to an unconstitutional "taking" prohibited by the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution.'
The Court refused to accept the utilities' analysis, holding instead
that there was nothing inherently unconstitutional in a regulatory
scheme that prohibited recovery of utility investments that are not
"used and useful" in providing service to the public. 6 It also rejected
the utilities' suggestion that they were7 entitled to a return on all
investments that were prudently made.

1. 109 S. Ct. 609 (1989).
2. Under former legislation, the Supreme Court could review by appeal state supreme
court decisions that upheld a state statute in the face of a constitutional challenge. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(2) (1982). Congress recently amended the legislation so that the Court may review by
writ of certiorari state supreme court decisions that uphold state statutes in the face of
constitutional challenges. Act of 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 3102 Stat. 662 (1988).
3. 66 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN., Tit. 66, § 1315 (Purdon 1979 & Supp. 1989) provides:
Except for such nonrevenue producing, nonexpense reducing investments as
may be reasonably shown to be necessary to improve environmental conditions
at existing facilities or improve safety at existing facilities or as may be
required to convert facilities to the utilization of coal, the cost of construction
or expansion of a facility undertaken by a public utility producing, generating,
transmitting, distributing or furnishing electricity shall not be made a part
of the rate base nor otherwise included in rates charged by the electric utility
until such time as the facility is used and useful in service to the public.
Except as stated in this section, no electric utility property shall be deemed
used and useful until it is presently providing actual utility service to the
customers. (Emphasis added).
4. Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 516 Pa. 142, 149, 532 A.2d 325, 332 (1987).
5. Id. at 148, 532 A.2d at 331. The fifth amendment reads in relevant part:
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
U.S. CONST. AMEND.

V.

6. Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 618-19.
7. Id. at 619-20.
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This Note examines the historical rise of the "used and useful"
and "prudent investment" regulatory standards. These standards are
discussed within the context of the Duquesne case, and possible
implications for the future of constitutional analysis of regulatory
issues are examined.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1973 the Central Power Coordinating Group ("CAPCO"),
composed of various utility companies, joined together to construct
seven large nuclear power plants! Both appellants, Duquesne and
Penn Power, were members of CAPCO and participated in the
construction venture. 9 After a history of considerable cost overruns
and construction delays, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
("PUC") began an investigation of the CAPCO construction program in 1979.10 Six months after the PUC began its investigation,
CAPCO announced its decision to cancel four of the seven power
plants." CAPCO cited several reasons for the cancellation: growing
political and regulatory difficulties following the Three Mile Island
accident; worsening financial condition of its members; and a growing
awareness that the additional electric capacity would not be needed.12
In 1980 and 1981 Duquesne went before the PUC seeking permission to recover the $34,697,389 it had spent on the abandoned
plants.' 3 The PUC delayed a ruling on the request until it received
the report from its investigation of CAPCO. 14 The report was issued
in late 1982. It declared that neither Duquesne nor Penn Power
could be faulted for participating in the power plant construction
project." In the words of the report's author, "the CAPCO decisions
in regard t'o the [canceled plants] at every stage to their cancellation,
were reasonable and prudent.'

In 1982
increase in
the course
the state's
in electric

' 6

Duquesne came before the PUC again to request an
rates to cover the costs of the abandoned plants.' 7 During
of these hearings, the Pennsylvania legislature amended
Utility Code, limiting the costs that could be included
utility rates.' 8 The Utility Code, as amended, prohibits

8. Id. at 612.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 613.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Administrative Law Judge Joseph Matuschak's October 15, 1982 "Report
of Investigation," Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at 19h, Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,
109 S. Ct. 609 (1989) (No. 87-1160)); see also Barasch, 516 Pa. at 144, 532 A.2d at 327.
17. Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 613.
18. Id. at 613-14 (citing 66 PA. STAT. ANNm.§ 1315 (Purdon 1979 & Supp. 1989)).
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the inclusion of the costs 1of9 any facility that is not "used and useful
in service to the public."
In 1983 the PUC issued a final order allowing Duquesne to
amortize its losses over a ten year period.20 The Pennsylvania Office
of Consumer Advocate ("Consumer Advocate") moved the PUC
for reconsideration. The Consumer Advocate argued that these losses
were costs within the meaning of the statute and, therefore, not
recoverable. 2 On reconsideration the PUC affirmed the original rate
order.? The PUC interpreted the act which amended the Utility
Code to forbid inclusion of the costs of the abandoned plants in
the utility's rate base but not their recovery as an operating cost
through amortization.23
The Consumer Advocate then took his case to the commonwealth
court where the PUC decisions were upheld. 24 The Consumer Advocate appealed this decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
which held that the PUC order violated the amended language of
the Utility Code and ordered the PUC to rescind the orders allowing
amortization.?1 The United States Supreme Court heard arguments
in the case on November 7, 1988, and handed down its decision
on January 11, 1989.26

19. Id. at 614.
20. Id. Amortization is an accounting practice whereby businesses recover the costs associated with their intangible property such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, business
goodwill, etc. It is comparable to the depreciation of tangible assets. The major difference
is that the deterioration of tangible property can be observed while intangible property devalues
according to its useful legal life. In the present case, an amortization period of 10 years was
selected as a reasonable figure by regulators. Amortization is generally figured at an equal
amount for each year and is regarded as an operating expense rather than as an asset. See
A. SHuGERmAN, AcCOUn'rNo FOR LAWYERS 297-98 (1952).
21. Duquesne, 109 S.Ct. at 613-14.
22. Id. at 614.
23. Barasch, 516 Pa. at 145, 532 A.2d at 328. The court stated,
Regarding the express dictate in section 1315 that such costs "shall not be
made part of the rate base nor otherwise included in rates charged," the
Commission opined that the foregoing statutory language was intended solely
to prevent the regulatory agency from giving a utility dual benefits of the
costs, i.e., including the costs in the rate base and in some other rate making
process.
Id. at 145-46, 532 A.2d at 328-29 (emphasis added by the court).
24. Duquesne, 109 S.Ct. at 614.
25. Barasch, 516 Pa. at 156, 532 A:2d at 339. The court stated,
We . . . hold that section 1315 of the [Utility] Code must be read as
prohibiting an electric utility from recovering the costs of cancelled plants
from ratepayers, either by making such costs part of its rate base or by
converting them into operating expenses through amortization. For us to
reach any other conclusion, we would have to treat as surplusage that part
of section 1315's proscription which says

the rates charged by the electric utility."
Id. at 129, 532 A.2d at 332.
26. Duquesne, 109 S.Ct at 609.

"...

nor otherwise included in
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As noted by the Court in Duquesne, utility rate-making proceedings
do not, as a rule, involve issues of constitutional magnitude.' 7 The
well-publicized failures of nuclear power projects have, however,
destabilized the public utility industry and prompted a re-examination
of the constitutional limits of state utility regulation.2 These failures
have tended to take three forms: the plants have come on line but
at prices far in excess of original expectations; the plants have been
completed but the capacity has been unneeded or "excess"; or the
plants have been abandoned before completion. 29 To grasp the reasons
behind this massive, industry-wide miscalculation, it is first necessary
to examine the roots of the crisis.
The period from the end of World War II to the late 1960's had
seen the demand for electricity increase by seven percent per year.30
This historical demand was expected to hold true for the foreseeable
future. 3 As a result, the typical utility of the late 1960's and early
1970's believed that it would have to provide almost twice as much
electricity to the public by the 1980's.32 In order to keep pace with
this growth in demand, many utility companies turned to nuclear
power as an answer to the projected increase in demand." Today,
with the cancellation of literally scores of these nuclear projects,
these decisions seem particularly ill-considered. However, the utility
planners of that earlier period had sound economic and environmental
reasons for choosing the nuclear option.
Most forecasters of the period had predicted that upon completion
nuclear power plants would be competitive with gas and coal fired
generation.- The oil embargo of 1973, which sent oil prices soaring
by as much as 180 percent during subsequent years, seemed to
confirm these predictions." This same crisis seemed to place the

27. Id. at 617.
28. See generally Gioia, The Prudence Standard: Recent Experience and Future Relevance,
PuB. UTi. FoRT., April 27, 1989, at 11.
29. Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and
Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. Rv. 497, 498-500 (1984).
Over one hundred nuclear units have been canceled, and many other such

units are only now nearing completion. Investments of approximately ten
billion dollars have already been lost as a result of nuclear plant cancellations,
and future cancellations are expected to involve additional sunk costs of five
to eight billion dollars. In addition, many of the recently completed or soonto-be completed plants represent scores of billions of dollars wasted on what
now appears to be totally superfluous generating capacity.
Id. at 498-99.
30. Kaufman, Commission Treatment of Overcapacity, National Regulatory Research Institute, No. 84-10, 16 (September 1984).
31. Pierce, supra note 29, at 500.
32. Kaufman, supra note 30, at 130.
33. Id.
34. Pierce, supra note 29, at 502.
35. Kaufman, supra note 30, at 132.
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uninterrupted supply of oil and gas in great jeopardy.3 6 Government
officials began to emphasize "energy independence" for the United
States and actively encouraged the switch to nuclear generation.7

The government also made it clear that for environmental reasons
it preferred nuclear to coal-fired generation. 8 Dramatic rises in the
cost of coal during the recession of 1974-75 drove utilities to further

reliance on the promises of nuclear energy.3 9
During the decade of the early 1970's to the 1980's, the projected
seven percent growth in demand did not materialize. Actual growth
took place at the more modest rate of three percent.40 Slower than
expected economic growth during the decade, drops in electric consumption due to price increases and more efficient use, steep declines
in the cost of both oil and natural gas, dramatic rises in the cost

of industrial capital, and increased political and regulatory antipathy
toward nuclear generation all combined to place the electric gen4

eration industry in a historically unique and quite unexpected crisis.

1

Across the nation, utility companies with nuclear power plants

under construction or ready to come on line found themselves in
a double predicament. The nuclear facilities were not needed as the

utilities were already awash in "excess capacity" and the cost of
new power from nuclear plants was often five to six times the cost
of power generated by other fuels.4 2 Faced with this no-win situation,
many utilities decided that the better part of valor was simply to

cancel their unfinished nuclear projects and cut their losses.

3

This

was the alternative chosen by the utilities in Duquesne."

36. Pierce, supra note 29, at 501.
37. As late as 1978 Congress instituted legislation that prohibited the use of "natural gas
or petroleum as a primary energy source in any new electric powerplant" built after November
of that year. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8311 (1982), see
Pierce, supra note 29, at 502 n.23.
38. Kaufman, supra note 30, at 134-35.
39. The price for a ton of coal jumped from $8.42 at the beginning of 1974 to an average
of $19.25 at the end of 1975. At one point during those years, the spot-market price of
coal was as high as $40 per ton. These statistics are reported in Kaufman, supra note 30,
at 133.
40. Pierce, supra note 29, at 502.
41. Id. at 503-05.
42. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss., 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988). The problems Duquesne
Power experienced with its nuclear plants are remarkably similar to thcse of many other
utilities. The following passage details the experience of Middle South Utilities with its Grand
Gulf nuclear project.
It was originally estimated that the cost per kilowatt of capacity would be
about $500; by the time commercial operations began, that cost amounted
to $2,933. The original estimate for the cost of two nuclear units at Port
Gibson was approximately $1.2 billion. Regulatory delays, additional construction requirements imposed after the Three Mile Island disaster, and
severe inflation, however, ran up Grand Gulf costs to more than $3 billion
dollars for the single unit.
Id. at 2432 n.5.
43. Pierce, supra note 29, at 497-98.
44. Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 612-13.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. The Historical Rise of Constitutional Regulatory Criteria
In 1877 the Supreme Court made its first foray into the area of
regulatory law in Munn v. Illinois.4 5 In Munn the Court explored
the state of Illinois' power under the Constitution to regulate private
grain elevators. It found the Illinois state legislature could regulate
these grain elevators because they were businesses "affected with
the public interest." The Court rejected the notion, however, that
the courts should review the actions of a state legislature. The Court
polls, not to the courts"
stated that "the people must resort to the
47
to find relief from unreasonable rates.
As the Court continued to deal with the regulation of businesses
such as grain elevators, toll roads, water utilities, and railroads, it
began to better understand the unique nature of these enterprises.
These businesses are unusual in that they were privately owned but
their assets were dedicated to the public use."s As the Duquesne
Court noted, this "partly public, partly private status of utility
property creates its own set
of questions under the Takings Clause
4' 9
of the Fifth Amendment."
Nine years after the ,1unn decision, the Court, in the Railroad
Commission Cases,50 first began to explore its role in answering
these fifth amendment questions.
This power to regulate is not a power to destroy. . . . Under
the pretense of regulating fares and freights, the state cannot
require a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward; neither can it do that which in law amounts to a
taking of private property for public use without just compensation, or without due process of lawA'

45. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
46. Id. at 126. Although the Court did not define this somewhat ambiguous phrase, it
seemed to be concerned mainly about the monopolistic character of these grain elevator
companies.
[Allthough in 1874 there were in Chicago fourteen warehouses adapted to
this particular business, and owned by about thirty persons, nine business
firms controlled them, and that the prices charged and received for storage
were such "as have been from year to year agreed upon and established by
the different elevators" . . . Thus it is apparent that all the elevating facilities
through which these vast productions "of seven or eight great States of the
West" must pass on the way "to four or five of the States on the seashore" may be a "virtual" monopoly.
Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 134.
48. Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 615.
49. Id.
50. 116 U.S. 307 (1886).
51. Id. at 331.
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Railroad Commission, thus, established the general principle that
regulation could be confiscatory if carried too far.5" The Court left
the determination of where to draw this line, however, to subsequent
decisions. In order to appreciate the practical difficulties the Court
faces when determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is first
necessary to understand both the rationale behind utility regulation
and the elements of the typical rate-making procedure.
B. The Need for Regulation
The need for government regulation in the electric utility industry
has traditionally been premised on the notion that these utilities are
"natural monopolies."" To an economist a monopoly is a natural
one if it is created by forces over which the monopolist has no
control;54 its creation may be unrelated to the number of sellers in
the marketplace:
The term does not refer to the actual number of sellers in a
market but to the relationship between demand and the technology of supply. If the entire demand within a relevant market
can be satisfied at lowest cost by one firm rather than by two
or more, the market is a natural monopoly, whatever the actual
number of firms in it."
Economists have isolated several factors which have driven the
electric utilities into monopolistic domination of their market areas.
First, electric power can only be transported efficiently over limited
distances. This limitation effectively defines the .mariket area for a
particular utility plant. It also reduces the number of utility companies
that can profitably operate within that limited market area.5 6 Second,
the high initial cost of starting a facility for electric generation
discourages newcomers from getting into the market.5 7 Third, utility
plants historically have been able to produce power more cheaply
as they have grown larger. This phenomenon is known as economies
of scale.58 The combined force of these three factors has inexorably
reduced most electric utility markets to a single large provider.5 9 The

52. Id. For a complete discussion of the relation between utility regulation and the takings
clause, see Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits on Utility
Rate Regulation, 65 B.U.L. Rav. 65 (1985) and Pond, The Law Governing the Fixing of
Public Utility Rates: A Response to Recent Judicial and Academic Misconceptions, 41 ADMEN.
L. REv. 1 (1989).
53. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548 (1969). It is
not my purpose here to do more than give a simplified description of these concepts as a
background to the discussion of the issues in Duquesne.
54. Black's Law Dictionary 908 (5th ed. 1979).
55. Posner, supra note 53, at 548.
56. J. BoNBRiGHT, PsMcIPzLrs oP Puuc Urn.rry RATms 11-17 (1961).
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. Posner, supra note 53, at 612.
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prospects for success of a new provider in the same market become
minimal:
If [another firm] enters in the mistaken belief that the market
will support more than one seller or that it is more efficient
than the incumbent, it will soon be eliminated either by bankruptcy or by being acquired (presumably at a low price, reflecting
its poor prospects) by the incumbent.6°
States have been justifiably fearful of the power of the monopolistic
utility companies to take unfair advantage of their position of dominance in the market. In response, state governments6 have established
regulatory bodies to curb the potential for abuse. '
C. The Rate-Making Procedure
When setting utility rates, the regulator must balance the utility's
need for adequate revenues against the consumer's need for reasonable rates. 62 In order to accomplish this balancing, the regulator
must make three initial determinations: (1) the utility's operating63
and maintenance costs; (2) its rate base; and, (3) its rate of return.
In the first determination, the regulator ascertains whether the utility's
operation and maintenance costs are in line with similar costs in
other sectors of the industrial economy.64 As part of this oversight,
the regulator will usually require the utility to adhere to standardized

60. Id.
61. Brief for the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates ("NASUCA")
as amicus curiae at 6-8, Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609 (1989) (No. 871160).
History shows that as the electric industry developed in this country individual state legislatures gradually determined that electric companies were
natural monopolies and that it was in society's interest to grant them monopoly

status....
In this context legislators disregarded one of the basic premises of a free
enterprise system: that free competition resulted in the best allocation of
society's resources and resulted in a fair price for an adequate output of
goods. . . .The regulator has the difficult and complex role of determining
rates that are just and reasonable from both the captive ratepayer and investor
perspectives.
62. New Mexico's Public Utility Act is a classic statement of the dual ends of a state
regulatory body:
It is the declared policy of the state that the public interest, the interest of
consumers and the interest of investors require the regulation and supervision
of such public utilities to the end that reasonable and proper services shall
be available at fair, just and reasonable rates, and to the end that capital
and investment may be encouraged and attracted so as to provide for the
construction, development and extension, without unnecessary duplication and
economic waste, of proper plants and facilities for the rendition of service
to the general public and to industry.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
63. See, KAHNi, Tre EcONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRitNciLEs AND INs rtrrxoNs 26-57 (1970).
64. Id. at 26-27.
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accounting6 practices so that comparisons can be made with reasonable
accuracy. 1
In the second determination, the rate base, the regulator places
a value on the utility's assets. For the typical electric utility, the
rate base will primarily include its investment in major items of
equipment: its power plants and transmission lines. 66 Rate base will
also generally include support facilities, real estate holdings such as
utility easements or office buildings, and other assets the utility uses
to provide service to its customers. 67 As in Duquesne, the regulator
may also be called upon to determine if investments in a failed or
non-useful facility may be included in the rate base."
In the third determination, the regulator sets an adequate rate of
return for the utility investors. Conceptually, this is a simple process.70
An adequate rate will be one that allows the utility to attract and
hold the equity capital necessary to provide service. 7' As the Duquesne
Court noted,
[a] public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to
earn a return . . . equal to that generally being made at the
same time and in the same general part of the country on
investments in other business undertakings
72 which are attended
by corresponding risks and uncertainties.
The regulator then combines these three figures using a rate-making
formula. The most commonly used formula is as follows:
Revenue
Requirement = Operating Cost + (Rate Base x Rate of
7
Return). 1
Since public utilities are unusually capital-intensive, the rate base
figure is typically the largest sum in the rate-making equation. By
virtue of its very size, the rate base tends to become the focus of
controversy. 74 Since both the cost of electricity and the utility com-

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 35-37.
Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 618.
69. KAHN, supra note 63, at 42-43.
70. Posner, supra note 53, at 594. Though conceptually simple, the actual determination
of an adequate or fair rate of return is often extremely difficult.
In deciding what the cost [of equityl is, however, the parties to the regulatory
proceeding and the commission itself are thrown back on very rough comparisons with other firms and other industries. Frequently these comparisons
are circular because they are to other regulated firms. When they are not
circular, they are misleading because they compare a regulated firm with
firms that are not monopolists and that are engaged in dissimilar business.
Id.
71. Id.
72. Duquesne, 109 S. Ct at 619 (quoting Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923)).
73. L. ScswARTz, F-E ENTRPasE AND ECONOhuC ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATIoN

326 (6th ed. 1985).

74. KxmN, supra note 63, at 36.
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pany's profits are to a large degree dependent on the size of the
rate base figure, it is not surprising that determination of the rate
base has historically been the most fiercely contested regulatory
issue." The present case6 is, at its simplest, merely a re-emergence
of this classic conflict.
D. Constitutional Standardsfor Rate Base Valuations
Over the years two distinct approaches to rate base valuation have
emerged. 7 These differing approaches have various names according
to the way in which they are applied in a particular case. The first
approach is most widely known as the "fair value rule." ' 78 Under
this rule, the regulator must appraise the utility's rate base (assets)
79
at its present day value or the cost to reproduce it in today's market.
Typically under this fair value approach only those assets actually
used and useful in providing service are included in the final rate
base figure.80 The second approach is called the "prudent investment
rule." 8' Generally speaking, under this rule the assets are valued at
the amount of capital prudently invested in them, or their actual
historical cost.8 2 All prudently invested amounts are then included
in the rate base regardless of whether they are currently used and
useful. 3
1. The Fair Value/Used and Useful Rule
The fair value rule can be traced to the Court's decision in Smyth
v. Ames.8 4 The Smyth Court held that "the basis of all calculations
as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation
maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the fair
value of the property being used by it for the convenience of the
public.''85
In Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 8 6 the Court amplified the
Smyth rule when it held that
[t]here must be a fair return upon the reasonable value of the
property at the time it is being used for the public. . . . [Tihe
value of the property is to be determined as of the time when
the inquiry is made regardingrates. If the property, which legally

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Duquesne, 109 S.Ct. at 613-14.
Id. at 616.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
169 U.S. 466 (1898).
Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
212 U.S. 19 (1909).
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enters into the consideration of the question of rates, has increased in value since it was acquired,
the company is entitled
87
to the benefit of such increase.
As noted above, the fair value rule includes two related concepts:
"used and useful" and "present or reproduction value." The logic
combining these concepts was cogently explained by the Duquesne
court as follows:
In theory the Smyth v. Ames fair value standard mimics the
operation of the competitive market. To the extent utilities'
investments in plants are good ones (because their benefits exceed
their costs) they are rewarded with an opportunity to earn an
"above-cost" return, that is a fair return on the current "market
value" of the plant. To the extent utilities' investments turn out
to be bad ones (such as plants that are canceled and so never
used and useful to the public), the utilities suffer because the
investments have no fair value and so justify no return. 8
The fair value rule, though persuasive in theory, was difficult to
implement.8 9 It required utility commissions to constantly reappraise
the value of utility property. Since "the current value of property
was necessarily a matter of judgment

.

was subject to dispute and litigation."

.

9

.

every commission decision

2. The Prudent Investment-Historical Cost Approach
As an alternative to the fair value approach, Justice Brandeis
proposed the prudent investment rule in his concurring opinion in
Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service
Commission.9 1 Justice Brandeis believed that the Constitution required that the utility be allowed to earn "a fair return on the
amount prudently invested in it."' ' Under this rubric, "the utility
is compensated for all prudent investments at their actual cost when
made (their 'historical' cost), irrespective of whether individual investments are deemed necessary or beneficial in hindsight." 93
Justice Brandeis found the fair value approach "legally and economically unsound."9 He argued that
[tihe rule of Smyth v. Ames sets the laborious and baffling task
of finding the present value of the utility. It is impossible to

87. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
88. Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 616; see also Pierce, supra note 29, at 525.
89. Gioia, supra note 27, at 12.
90. Id.
91. 262 U.S. 276, 310 (1923).
92. Id. at 289.
93. Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 616. "Every investment may be assumed to have been made
in the exercise of reasonable judgment, unless the contrary is shown." Mo. ex re. S. W. Bell
Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at 289 n.l.
94. Mo. ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at 290.
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find an exchange value for a utility, since utilities, unlike merchandise or land, are not commonly bought and sold on the
market. Nor can the present value of the utility be determined
by capitalizing its net earnings, since earnings are determined,
in large measure, by the rate which the company will be permitted
to charge; and, thus, the vicious circle will be encountered. 9

"The thing," Justice Brandeis noted, "devoted by the investor to
the public use is not specific property, tangible and intangible, but

capital embarked in the enterprise."' ' Under this approach, the rate
base valuation would remain stable and not vary up or down depending on the current economic trend.Y Moreover, the approach
would remove the subjectivity of appraisals and provide a factual
foundation for rate base valuations. 98
As Justice Rehnquist noted in the Duquesne decision, the Brandeis
prudent investment formula avoids
the difficult valuation problems encountered under the Smyth
v. Ames test because it relies on the actual historical cost of
investments as the basis for setting the rate. The amount of a
utility's actual outlays for assets in the public service is more
easily ascertained by a rate-making body because less judgment
is required than in valuing an asset."
The Brandeis formula further simplified the regulatory process because there was the presumption of prudence on the part of the

utility investor. '00
Brandeis saw the stability and simplicity of the prudent investment

approach as rendering benefits both to the investor and the consumer.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 292 (emphasis added).
Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
Gioia, supra note 28, at 12.
The Court in Missouri. ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. explained:
The adoption of the amount prudently invested as the rate base and the
amount of the capital charge as the measure of the rate of return would
give definiteness to these two factors involved in rate controversies which
are now shifting, and treacherous and which render the [regulatory] proceedings peculiarly burdensome and largely futile .... The rate base would
be ascertained as a fact, not determined as a matter of opinion. .

.

. It

would not be distorted by the fickle and varying judgments of appraisers,
commissions, or courts. It would, when once made in respect to any utility,
be fixed, for all time, subject only to increases to represent additions to
plant, after allowance for the depreciation included in the annual operating
charges.
262 U.S. at 306-07.
99. Duquesne, 109 S.Ct. at 617 n.6 (emphasis added).
100. Mo. ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at 289 n.l. The Court states,
The term prudent investment is not used in the critical sense. There should
not be excluded from the finding of the [rate] base, investments which, under
ordinary circumstances, would be deemed reasonable. The term is applied
for the purpose of excluding what might be found to be dishonest or obviously
wasteful or imprudent expenditures.
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The investor could count on a predictable and steady return on his
investment. The consumer could be freed of the high cost of capital
associated with the speculative investment environment under the
fair value rule.' 0 '
3. The End-Result Test
Despite the attractiveness of the prudent investment/historical cost
approach and its acceptance by many commentators and courts, the
fair value rule remained the constitutionally required standard until
1944.102 It was not officially abandoned by the Court until Federal
Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,103 The Hope Court
held that the Constitution mandated no single rate-making formula.
Rather, it merely required that fair, nonconfiscatory rates be the
end result of the rate making process.
It is not the theory but the impact of the rate order which
counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to
be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act [the
Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. Section 7171 is at an end.
The fact that the method employed to reach that result may
contain infirmities is not then important. Moreover, the Commission's order does not become suspect by reason of the fact
that it is challenged. It is the product of expert judgment which
carries a presumption of validity.' 0
At issue in Hope was the validity of rates set by the Federal
05 Under the Natural Gas
Power Commission ("FPC").1
Act of 1938
(the "Act"), the FPC was given the authority to set interstate natural
gas rates at levels that were "just and reasonable."'1' Congress,
however, provided no formula in the Act by which such rates.could
be determined.

°7

The case began when the complaints were filed with the FPC,
charging that Hope's interstate rates were excessive.1°8 After an
investigation, the FPC ordered Hope to reduce its interstate rates.' °9
The FPC's decision was based, in part, on a finding that Hope had
overvalued its rate base when it used reproduction cost (the fair
value method) in its valuation."10 The FPC refused to place any
reliance on Hope's reproduction cost formula saying that "it was

101. Id. at 304-08.

102. Drobak, supra note 52, at 83-84.
103. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

104. Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 593.
106. Id. at 600.

107. Id.
108. Id. at 594.
109. Id. at 595.
110. Id. at 596-97.
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not predicated upon facts and was too conjectural and illusory to
be given any weight . . . ."I" Instead, the FPC opted for a rate
base figure that reflected Hope's actual historical investment." 2 On
review, the court of appeals set aside the FPC mandated rate reduction." 3 The Court held that the FPC, in determining the value
of the rate base, "should have considered reproduction cost . . .
and that 'actual legitimate cost' (prudent investment) was not the
proper measure of 'fair value' where price levels had changed since
the investment.""14 By affirming the constitutionality of the FPC
rates, the Court implicitly accepted the validity of the historical
cost/prudent investment approach. It necessarily rejected the notion
that the fair value/used and useful approach was the only constitutionally acceptable rate methodology."-'
The wisdom of the Hope end-result test was that it did not tie
constitutional analysis to a single rate-making theory. Its weakness
was in its lack of specificity. The Court never delineated an exact
test by which the fairness of the end result could be measured.
Rather it opted for a regimen of "pragmatic adjustments.""16 As a
broad rule it stated that "[t]he rate-making process under the Act,
i.e., the fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing
of the investor and the consumer interests."' 7 In describing the
investor side of the scale, the Hope Court stated:
[Ilt is important that there be enough revenue not only for
operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business.
These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock.
By that standard the return to the equity owner should be
commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises
having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the
enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital." 8
On the consumer side, the Hope Court noted that the primary
aim of the regulation under review was "to protect consumers against
exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies."" 9 It also noted
that "regulation does not insure that the business shall produce net
revenues.''120 Beyond these broad outlines, the Court did not venture.

111. Id. at 597.
112. Id. at 596.
113. Id. at 599.
114. Id. at 600.
115. Id. at 602.
116. Id.

117. Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
118. Id. (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 611.

120. Id. at 603 (quoting Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S.
575, 590 (1942)).
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By allowing any rate making standard which would produce a
reasonable result, the Court accepted the limits of its own authority.
It recognized that the FPC's rate-setting activities were well within
Congress' power "to regulate the prices of commodities in interstate
commerce.'

' 2

' Under the Constitution, then, the Court could not

substitute its "opinions for the expert judgment of the administrators
to whom Congress entrusted the [rate-making] decision."' ' The
Court's duty was the more circumscribed one of ensuring that the
final rate would not be "unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.'"
Because the Hope decision did not provide firm guidance, con24
troversy over the valuation of the rate base has continued to rage.
Two factors have combined to keep this controversy alive: the
conflicting policy considerations embodied in the competing regulatory standards and the divergent economic interests of the utility
investors and the ratepayers."-'
The policy behind the fair value rule is to make regulation mimic
26
the competitive marketplace.

A competitive market does not forgive mistakes in forecasting
demand or in projecting the costs of alternative means of providing service, however understandable those mistakes may
be. . . . In a competitive market, firms operating with excess
capacity do not earn a return on that capacity. Nor do firms
that cancel partially completed plants because of unanticipated
27
shortfalls in demand recover their investments in the plants.
The policy behind the prudent investment rule, on the other hand,
is to bring certainty and stability to the regulated industry.' 1 Brandeis
saw controversy and uncertainty as destructive forces.
Controversy with utilities is obviously injurious also to the public
interest. The prime needs of the community are that facilities
be ample and that rates be as low and as stable as possible.
The community can get cheap service from private companies,
only through cheap capital. It can get efficient service, only if

Id. at 601 (quoting Natural Gas, 315 U.S. at 582).
Id. at 615.
Id. at 602.
Drobak, supra note 52, at 112-25.
Id.
Duquesne, 109 S.Ct. at 616.
Pierce, supra note 29, at 525.
The Court in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. stated:
To give to capital embarked in public utilities the protection guaranteed by
the Constitution. and to secure for the public reasonable rates, it is essential
that the rate base be definite, stable, and readily ascertainable; and that the
percentage to be earned on the rate base be measured by the cost, or charge,
of the capital employed in the enterprise.
Mo. er rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at 292.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
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managers of the utility are free to devote themselves to problems
of operation and of development. It can get ample service through
private companies, only if investors may be assured of receiving

continuously a fair return upon the investment.' 29

The competing economic interests of the consumer and the investor
have also kept the debate over regulatory standards alive. The fair
value rule was first championed by ratepayers during a time of
unparalleled deflation. 30 These ratepayers were unwilling to pay a
high cost for a regulated service when the cost of everything else
3
had fallen dramatically.1 1
Utilities and their investors, on the other hand, have championed
the fair value approach during times of escalating prices, hoping to
profit from the inflated value of the rate base. 3 2 Faced with the
devaluation of the utility's property, however, the
investor seeks the
33
protection of the prudent investment approach.
In Hope the Court clearly removed itself from the role of refereeing
rate squabbles and adopted a role of general oversight.' 3 ' Having
found that the end result of the rate was fair to both investors and
consumers, it left further delineation of fairness under the end result
approach to subsequent courts.'
E. The Duquesne Decision

The Duquesne Court unequivocally accepted the Hope end result
-test. 3 6 By so doing, the Court again refused to place itself in the
midst of every investor/consumer controversy.' 37 It stated that these
controversies had constitutional implications "at the margins."' 38
"The economic judgments required in rate proceedings are often

129. Id. at 308.
130. See id. at 287, 298; see also, Hope 320 U.S. at 596-97; Bluefield Waterworks, 262
U.S. at 684.
Reproduction cost, as the measure, or as evidence, of present value was,
also, pressed then by representatives of the public who sought to justify
legislative reductions of railroad rates. The long depression which followed
the panic of 1893 had brought prices to the lowest level reached in the
Nineteenth Century. Insistence upon reproduction cost was the shippers's
protest against burdens believed to have resulted from watered stocks, reckless
financing, and unconscionable construction contracts.
Mo. ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at 298.
131. Mo. ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at 298.
132. Hope, 320 U.S. at 596.
133. Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 619-20 (Duquesne urged the Court to approve the prudent
investment rule as a required constitutional rate-making standard); Market Street Railway Co.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 324 U.S. 548, 567 (1945).
134. Hope, 320 U.S. at 601 ('.[Flair value' is the end product of the process of ratemaking
not the starting point . . .").
135. Id. at 605.
136. Duquesne, 109 S.Ct. at 616 n.5.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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hopelessly complex and do not admit of a single correct result. The39
Constitution is not designed to arbitrate these economic niceties.'
The Duquesne Court began its analysis by recognizing that both
utility companies had a duty, under the state's Utility Code, to serve
the public. 40 The state had a corresponding constitutional duty to
set rates at "higher than a confiscatory level.' ' 14 "If the rate does
not afford sufficient compensation," the Court noted, "the State
has taken the use of utility property without paying just compensation
and so violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."' 142 The Court
admitted, however, that "[n]either law nor economics has yet devised3
generally accepted standards" to guarantee non-confiscatory rates.'
The Court then noted that in the present case, as in Hope, the
utilities had not alleged that the challenged rates put them in financial
difficulties.'" For example, the 35 million dollars Duquesne had
invested in the canceled nuclear plants comprised only 1.9 percent
of its rate base. 4 The decision to disallow recovery of these costs
only reduced Duquesne's and Penn Power's annual revenue allowances by approximately 0.5 percent for each utility.14 The Court
found that:
[t]he overall impact of the rate orders, then, is not constitutionally
objectionable. No argument has been made that these slightly
reduced rates jeopardize the financial integrity of the companies,
either by leaving them insufficient operating capital or by impeding their ability to raise future capital. Nor has it been
demonstrated that these rates are inadequate to compensate current equity holders for the risk associated with their investments
under a modified prudent investment scheme.' 4 7
The utilities argued, however, that the Utility Code, as amended
by section 1315 was unconstitutional because it combined two inconsistent regulatory standards.,48 According to the utilities, the Code
required the Commission to produce the lowest possible rates by
shifting between the prudent investment and market value approaches. 4 9

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 619 (emphasis added).
Id. at 615.
Id. at 616 (quoting FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1974)).
Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 616.
Id. (quoting Permain Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1968)).
Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 618; see also Hope, 320 U.S. at 605.
Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 618.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 617 n.7.
The appellants, in their reply brief submitted to the Duquesne Court, argued:
Pennsylvania's methodology is unacceptable because it requires the Pennsylvania Utility Commission to shift between prudent investment and market
value regulatory methods as needed to produce the lowest possible rate. If
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The Duquesne Court specifically stated that if Pennsylvania had
arbitrarily switched back and forth between rate methodologies "in
a way which required investors to bear the risk of bad investments
at some times while denying them the benefit of good investments
at others," a serious constitutional question would be raised.15 0 The
Court ruled, however, that the end result of the state's mingling of
regulatory standards under section 1315 had not been unreasonable.'
Therefore, the challenged amendments to the Utility Code did not
amount to an impermissible vacillation between methodologies. 5 2
Finally, the Court expressly refused to make the prudent investment/historical cost methodology a constitutional standard. The Court
held that "[tihe designation of a single theory of rate making as
a constitutional requirement would unnecessarily foreclose 53alternatives which could benefit both consumers and investors.'1
V. IMPLICATIONS OF DUQUESNE
The importance of Duquesne is in its reaffirmation of the Hope
end-result approach to rate regulation. It clearly held that a rate is
never automatically confiscatory simply because it disallows some
utility costs under a particular rate-making formula. '54 However, like
Hope, Duquesne did not indicate how much cost disallowance might
be too much. Though Duquesne mentioned the utility's interest in
maintaining its financial integrity as a factor in setting rates, 5 the
Court did not clearly indicate where the line between fair and
confiscatory rates should be drawn. The Duquesne Court refused
to address this issue since neither of the utilities before it alleged
56
any serious financial harm.

utility operations have successfully matched available electrical generating
capacity and actual consumer demand for electricity, whether due to beneficial
circumstances or to efficient management, Pennsylvania applies the prudent
investment utility methodology. Under this approach, investors in the utility
are restricted to a return of and a modest return on the historical value of
their original investment. On the other hand, if utility management prudently
expends funds to prepare for reasonably anticipated future growth, but that
growth does not materialize, Act 335 [section 1315] is applied. Suddenly the
State looks not at the amount of the original prudent investment but rather
to the market value of the items or services purchased. Regardless of how
prudent an investment may have been when made, it is conclusively presumed
to have no value and on that basis the statute bars the utility from retrieving
any part of its investment.
Reply Brief for Appellants at 8, Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609 (1989) (No.
87-1160) (emphasis in original).
150. Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 619.
151. Id. at 617-18.
152. Id. at 619.
153. Id.at 620.
154. Id. at 615-20.
155. Id.at 617, 618.
156. Id.at 620.
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A possible indication of the Court's post-Duquesne direction may
be inferred from its subsequent handling of In re Public Service
Co. of New Hampshire.5 7 On January 28, 1988, the Public Service
Company of New Hampshire ("PSNH") became the first public
utility company since the Depression era to file for bankruptcy.'
The utility was denied recovery of investments in a non-useful nuclear
power plant under an amendment to New Hampshire's utility statute
similar to that at issue in Duquesne.5 9 Unlike the utilities in Duquesne, the rate decision had a significant adverse effect on PSNH.'60
Despite the utility's financial difficulty, the Supreme Court dismissed
an appeal from the New Hampshire Supreme Court "for want of
a properly presented federal question."' 6' The apparent conclusion
to be drawn from this action is that nothing in the Duquesne decision
requires regulators to automatically guarantee the financial health
of a public utility company.
At least one commentator has concluded that the Court made a
62
mistake by choosing not to hear the New Hampshire case.
The Court need not have reviewed the Duquesne case; it simply
told us what we already knew: That a state legislature can enact
laws governing utility rate making . . . if they invoke a coherent
policy based upon reasoned analysis, and are not arbitrary or
capricious.
But the appeal of the Public Service Company of New Hampshire
posed a question that the Court left unanswered: Must regulators
bow to a valid law or policy and deny cost recovery for canceled
plant, even if compliance leads inexorably to a final rate award
that is confiscatory and thus unlawful of its own accord.6 3
Perhaps this commentator is ignoring the answer implicit in the
Brandeis prudent investment test. "The term [prudent investment]
is applied for the purpose of excluding what might be found to be
dishonest or obviously wasteful or imprudent expenditures," wrote
Justice Brandeis.'"6 Even though the original presumption was that
"[e]very investment may be assumed to have been made in the
exercise of reasonable judgment . . .*1,16' there has been a definite
shift to the contrary presumption where failed nuclear projects are

157. 130 N.H. 265, 539 A.2d 263 (1988), appeal dismissed, sub. nom. Pub. Serv. Co. of
N.H. v. N.H., 109 S. Ct. 858 (1989).
158. Radford, The Supreme Court Took the Wrong Case, PuB. UTr. FORT., Feb. 16,
1989 at 4.
159. In re Pub. Sery. Co. of N.H., 130 N.H. at 276, 539 A.2d at 274.
160. Radford, supra note 158, at 4.
161. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 109 S. Ct. at 858.
162. Radford, supra note 158, at 4-6.
163. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
164. Mo. ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 262 U.S. at 289 n.j.
165. Id.
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concerned.'6 Perhaps the Court, upon reviewing the record, determined that PSNH's nuclear investments were so obviously imprudent
that no further review was necessary.
Another possible answer may perhaps be found in the state court
decision in the New Hampshire case. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court concluded that Hope and its progeny did not guarantee the
financial integrity of public utility companies:
The Supreme Court has expressly held that it is not the mandate
of the constitution to rejuvenate the value of the investments
of a company whose "zenith of opportunity" has been eclipsed
by the operation of economic forces. Providing a return sufficient
to maintain the financial integrity of a sound company is one
thing; restoring the financial integrity is another. 67
VI. CONCLUSION
In Duquesne, the Court reaffirmed the regulatory policy that it
had approved forty-five years previously in Hope. By its acceptance
of Hope's end result test, the Court has declared that as long as
utility rates are reasonable, in the final analysis no constitutional
question has been raised. Even the mingling of apparently inconsistent
rate standards is acceptable if the rates pass the end result test. The
Duquesne decision should lay to rest the recent arguments of utilities,
facing large losses on uncompleted or unneeded nuclear facilities,
that the Constitution mandates a return on any prudently made
investment. The decision does not, however, define the range of
reasonableness in which rates can be set. As Justice Scalia noted in
his concurrence, the decision deals with "techniques rather than
consequences.' ' 16
PETER J. GOULD

166. Laros & Haubold, The Shifting Standard of Prudence: Implicationsfor Utilities, PuB.
Um.L. FORT., October 29, 1987, at 21-27.
Over the years, the standard regarding the presumption of reasonableness
has been gradually eroded to the point that, as a practical matter in most
states, the burden of proof of demonstrating management reasonableness
rests today squarely on the shoulders of the regulated utility. Nowhere has
this been more evident than when utilities have sought to recover capital
costs associated with the design and construction of major (primarily nuclear)
power plant facilities.
Id. at 22.
167. In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 130 N.H. at 272, 539 A.2d at 270 (citations omitted).
168. Duquesne, 109 S. Ct. at 621.

